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For Whom the Bell Trolls: Shifting ‘Troll’ Behaviour in the Twitter Brexit 
Debate 
Abstract 
Twitter released a list of 2,752 accounts believed connected to state-sponsored Russian operative manipulation of the 2016 
American Election. We investigated the behaviour of these accounts in the UK-EU referendum using our longitudinal Twitter 
dataset. We identified Brexit-related content from 419 of these accounts, totalling 3,485 tweets between 29th August 2015 and 
3rd October 2017. While these accounts were primarily designed to resemble American citizens, accounts created in 2016 
contained German and Italian locations and terms in user profiles, suggesting targeting of wider international electoral processes. 
Brexit was one of many targets, likely indicating coordinated repurposing of ‘troll’ activity over time. We analyse behavioural 
shifts in account behaviour in relation to external events, introducing a temporal dimension not typical of political Twitter 
studies. The ‘troll’ account behaviour altered radically on UK-EU referendum day, shifting from generalised disruptive tweeting 




Whether, and to what extent, the activities on Twitter of the Internet Research Agency (IRA) 
based in St Petersburg (commonly known as a Russian ‘troll factory’) influenced the outcome 
of the UK-EU referendum has been the subject of much speculation and of official UK 
parliamentary inquiry1. However, little solid evidence has been available on the nature or 
extent of this intervention, or on whether it was in fact targeted specifically at the UK’s 
referendum on EU membership.  
Trolls are human internet users who attempt to manipulate opinion by spreading rumours, 
speculation and false information (Mihaylov, Georgiev, and Nakov 2015). Twitter identified 
2,752 so-called troll accounts they claim are likely run by the IRA, a Russian company, which 
was identified as tweeting about the US 2016 elections2. We have been collecting tweets on 
the topic of the UK-EU ‘Brexit’ referendum since August 2015. Using a sophisticated 
multiple collection strategy to minimise selection bias (anonymised reference), we have 





collected over 70 million Brexit-related tweets. Our findings, using advanced analytical 
methods including machine-learning to analyse the tweet text and metadata from our derived 
and aggregated data3, allow us to provide important insights into the behaviour of these 
known Twitter ‘trolls’ over time and in relation to external events. We can also analyse the 
different types of content that their tweets contain and the implications of this for the 
detection of different types of human (‘troll’) verses automated behaviour (‘bot’) or hybrid 
automated/human (‘cyborg’) behaviour deployed in relation to key political events, such as 
Brexit.  
We provide detailed analysis of the behaviour of the IRA-linked accounts identified by 
Twitter and discuss the strategy and intentions that appear to underlie this behaviour. We find 
that the scatter-gun disinformation approach observed in the Twitter behaviour of these 
accounts is consonant with known Kremlin foreign policy strategy, with roots in the Soviet 
dezinformatsia approach (Shultz and Godson, 1986), aimed to disrupt and disorientate foreign 
regimes and to create a widespread sense of chaos and instability (White, 2016). We find that 
although targeting the US election was the identifying feature of these accounts (and most 
indeed masqueraded as bone-fide US citizens), there was evidence of more widespread 
international agitation, with some of these accounts also generating fake German and Italian 
user profiles. We do find evidence of Brexit-related activity. In particular, we find evidence 
of a shift in IRA-related account behaviour on the day of the referendum on UK membership 
of the EU. Brexit, however, was one of many targets for these accounts, likely indicating a 
coordinated repurposing of account activity over time as part of a wider disinformation 
strategy. These accounts, of course, were identified specifically as a consequence of their 
tweeting about the US 2016 Elections, and there may yet be other unidentified troll accounts 
that specifically targeted the Brexit referendum.  
                                                        
3 As a consequence of our ethical procedure, the Twitter Develop Agreement, and following legal advice we are unable to 
disclose or share usernames, the usernames of retweeted users (unless they are verified users) or any full tweets. We utilise this 
information in our analysis but it remains confidential. Access to any images or videos contained in these tweets is no longer 
possible as these have been removed from the Twitter website. 
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Political Twitter Strategies and the International Disinformation Ecology 
The emerging international disinformation ecology and the role played by social-media 
platforms are topics of increasing academic and policy concern (Derakhshan and Wardle 
2017). ‘Active-measures’, including the funding of outlets to spread disruptive 
disinformation, are a regular part of the work of the Russian espionage and security agencies, 
with the specific nature of these activities adapted to target the different points of 
vulnerability of different foreign states. Disruption, the encouragement of internal divisions 
and the fomenting of widespread uncertainty, is a common strategic approach to states with 
strong institutional structures and little affiliation with Russia (Galeotti, 2017). 
 
On-line grassroots movements can be faked, a phenomenon referred to as astroturfing. 
Essentially this is a form of propaganda activity. Biased and misleading information is 
coordinated and shared to promote a specific point of view. The exponential evolution of 
social-media sites allows direct, and fast, communication to and amongst the public. While 
this approach can be used by governments, political parties and campaign groups (Briant 
2015), it can also be used by less formal and more covert forces to spread propaganda. 
Grassroots social-media activism is thought to have had a significant influence on, amongst 
other political events, Obama’s 2008 US election campaign, the organisation of the 2011 
Occupy Wall Street movement (Juris 2012) and Corbyn’s 2015 Labour Leadership campaign 
(Chadwick and Stromer-Galley 2016). The astroturfing effect has been highlighted by Cho et 
al. (2011) who demonstrate that uncertainty increased and belief in the likelihood that climate 
change is a real phenomenon decreased amongst those that had been exposed to climate 
change-denying astroturf websites. Harris et al. (2014) describe the various methods through 
which the social-media site Twitter is used for distributing astroturf propaganda. They 
discuss, for example, how a ‘Twitter bomb’ (increased Twitter activity on a specific subject in 
a short period of time) was used to promote a false sense of agreement and encourage 




The use of automatically generated Twitter content is also commonplace, Bessi and Ferrara 
(2016) found, for example, that one fifth of the Twitter conversation about the 2016 US 
Elections was not generated by humans. ‘Bot’ accounts are set up to automatically retweet 
and aggregate content from other sources or to create automatically generated text. ‘Influence 
bots’ were described in the DARPA (Defence Advanced Research Project Agency) Twitter 
Bot Challenge as bots designed to influence discussion on social-media sites (Subrahmanian 
et al. 2016). Social-media companies are not required to fact check information. Catchiness 
and repeatability can lead to widespread dissemination of content whether it is true or not 
(Ratkiewicz et al. 2011). Bots are often used as a method for repeating information and 
making it appear that the information is popular (Ferrara et al. 2016). As bots have become 
more advanced, they are able to interact with other bots and humans in a conversational type 
way making them more believable and increasing their social networks (Ferrara et al. 2016). 
Automatically extracting information from real users and from the wider internet allows the 
automatic generation of life-like user profile information creating complex and believable 
‘sock puppet’ personas (Ferrara et al. 2016). 
 
Automated accounts can be used to produce large amounts of content on single issues, where 
many accounts become active and tweet on the same topic at once forming a ‘bot-legion’ 
(Chu et al. 2012). Ratkiewicz et al (2011) describe how nine automated fake users tweeted 
929 times in 138 minutes in a 2009 Massachusetts election. This type of activity is intended 
to start a cascade of information spreading with non-automated accounts then also 
reproducing the content. Messages are also more likely to be believed if they are seen from 
multiple sources (Ratkiewicz et al. 2011, Del Vicario et al. 2016)). This creates a normalising 
wallpaper effect – as the information is seen so often it becomes background noise and is 
assumed to be true.  
 
Cyborgs, have the behaviour patterns of both bots and humans and are at least partially 
operated by humans (Chu et al. 2012). Cyborgs are harder to detect than bots as they have the 
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behaviour patterns of both bots and humans. Snap-shot Twitter analyses might easily 
miscategorise cyborgs as bots, if only one element of their behaviour was captured on any 
given day. 
 
Astro-turfing may involve the use of bots, cyborgs or sock puppets to emulate the personas of 
individuals involved in grassroot political movements (Ratkiewicz et al. 2011). Astro-turf-
cyborgs commonly combine political information with more general human content. Keller et 
al (2017) found that cyborgs were used in astroturfing by the South Korean secret service in 
the 2012 elections. They observed specific behaviour patterns: having many accounts tweet 
the same tweet at the same time to influence trending topics, having an agent cut and paste 
roughly the same content into many accounts, and a consistent time pattern for the activity in 
the accounts. They found that human troll accounts often act in similar and repetitive ways, as 
these individual trolls are following coordinated central instructions. 
 
The Brexit discussion on Twitter differed from the political debates surrounding general 
elections, as voters were presented with a binary choice between leaving or remaining in the 
EU. This choice did not map directly on to the opinions of the mainstream political parties, 
with the exception of the UKIP party and the ‘leave’ option. The official campaign groups 
were newly formed for this referendum and used social-media platforms to mobilise and 
organise their base from pre-existing and emerging grassroots movements (Usherwood and 
Wright 2017). The public see digital platforms as a medium for conducting political debate 
and thereby reshaping the opinions of political parties and in this case referendum campaigns 
(Chadwick and Stomer-Galley 2016). Howard and Kollanyi (2016), in a study of tweets 
collected between 5th and the 12th June 2016 in the Brexit referendum, found that bots 
played a ‘small but strategic role in the referendum conversations’ but that not all accounts 
were completely automated.  They found that bots played a strategic role in amplifying 
messages rather than proposing original arguments. They also find that a third of content in 
their dataset was produced by only one percent of the accounts. They suggest that due to the 
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amount of content produced, this might indicate bot activity.  Bastos and Mercea (2017) 
found a network of 13,493 bots that tweeted on the Brexit referendum but disappeared after 




‘Troll’ Activity in a Longitudinal Brexit-Related DataSet 
Data Sources 
On October 31st 2017 Sean Edgett, a legal representative of Twitter, presented 
evidence to the United States Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism2. He 
provided details of 2,752 accounts that were linked to the IRA. These 2,752 accounts were 
identified using information obtained by Twitter from third-party sources. The accounts also 
produced automated content, but approximately 53 percent of their output was produced by 
humans (referred to as ‘trolls’, but see our discussion below on the hybrid ‘cyborg’ nature of 
these accounts). Twitter studied tweets from 1st September 2016 to 15th November 2016. In 
written testimony these accounts were described as being ‘Russian election-focused efforts’4. 
The troll accounts posed as news outlets, activists, and politically engaged Americans. 
Edgett's testimony describes the troll behaviour as: contacting prominent individuals through 
mentions, organising political events and abusive behaviour / harassment.  
 
No equivalent list of Twitter trolls is directly available for the Brexit referendum. As part of a 
review of ‘Fake News’, Damian Collins MP, Chair of the UK parliament’s Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sports Select Committee asked that the UK parliament be provided with ‘a list of 
accounts linked to the IRA and any other Russian linked accounts that it [Twitter] has 
removed and examples of any posts from these accounts that are linked to the United 
Kingdom’ 4. Twitter responded with six tweets from Russia Today. In the absence of a 
specific officially-published list detailing accounts from the IRA that were active in the Brexit 




debate, we investigate whether any of the accounts known to be active on the 2016 US 
Election also produced content related to Brexit. We also analyse the changing nature of their 
behaviour in relation to the UK’s EU referendum.  
 
We have been collecting Twitter data on the Brexit since August 2015. These data allow us to 
study discussions leading up the referendum and the consequential reaction to the decision of 
the UK to leave the European Union (anonymised reference). Data were gathered through the 
Twitter API based on a selection of relevant hashtags chosen by a panel of academic experts. 
The set of hashtags5 was updated periodically, to reflect the evolving conversation on Brexit. 
The dataset currently contains over seventy million tweets.  
 
In our dataset we found 3,485 tweets from the 419 identified troll accounts that were collected 
between the 29th August 2015 and 3rd October 2017. These tweets contained content about 
the Brexit vote and related topics that were expected to influence the vote, such as the EU, 
refugees and migrants. 3,485 is, of course, a tiny proportion of the overall number tweets but 
it does indicate that some of the same trolls, identified as tweeting about the US elections, 
were also active in the Brexit debate. We are confident that we will, if anything, have 
underestimated any Brexit effect. 
 
The user accounts of the trolls identified by Twitter have now been deleted and are not 
available from Twitter directly. The terms of service of the Twitter Developer Agreement ask 
that all Tweets are ‘deleted within 24 hours after a request to do so by Twitter’6. We have an 
automated method in place that removes all tweets as requested. Therefore, it is entirely 
possible that some tweets relevant to this study have been deleted, making our findings a 
conservative estimate of troll activity. Unique archived collection of tweets, such as ours, are 
                                                        
5 The hashtags chosen for collection are #eureferendum, #euref, #brexit, #no2eu, #yes2eu, #notoeu, #yestoeu, #betteroffout, 
#betteroffin, #voteout, #votein, #eureform, #ukineu, #bremain ,#eupoll, #ukreferendum, #ukandeu, #eupol, #imagineeurope, 
#edeuref, #myimageoftheeu #eu, #referendum, #europe, #ukref, #ref, #migrant, #refugee #strongerin, #leadnotleave, 
#voteremain, #britainout, '#leaveeu, #voteleave, #beleave, #loveeuropeleaveeu, #greenerin, #britin, #eunegotiation, 
#eurenegotiation, #grassrootsout, #projectfear, #projectfact, #remaineu, #europeanunion, #brexitfears, #remain, #leave, 
#takecontrol, #euinorout, #leavechaos, #labourin, #conservatives, #bregret, #brexitvote, #brexitin5words, #labourcoup, 




now the only way that academic research into troll activity in the Brexit discussion can be 
conducted. Our collection strategy means that although we have over 70 million tweets 
collected we only collect a sample of all tweets on the Brexit debate; there are likely therefore 
to be additional tweets from trolls on this topic that we will not have collected. While we will 
have only a proportion of the full content produced by the trolls, as we also have likely the 
largest longitudinal Twitter data collection on Brexit, this analysis of the captured troll 




The selection of hashtags used to populate our dataset ensured that we gathered both tweets 
that related to the Brexit vote directly and also to topics that were expected by experts to 
influence opinions on Brexit. When researching whether the troll accounts were active in the 
Brexit discussions we split the data into tweets that were directly about Brexit and those that 
contained other related topics such as refugees and migration. We annotated tweets we had 
gathered from the Twitter-identified troll accounts on the basis of whether they were directly 
about Brexit or not. The annotators were asked to be conservative and only to include tweets 
in the Brexit set if they were absolutely certain they were directly about the Brexit 
referendum itself. We found that 1,357 were directly about Brexit, 2,109 were not and 19 
were difficult to decide. This gave us 38.94 percent of the tweets that were directly about 
Brexit. Henceforth we will call these sets ‘Brexit Tweets’ and ‘Related Tweets’. The 19 
undecided tweets were excluded from the study. A single coder annotated all tweets and a 
sub-sample (100) was double coded to validate consistency and measure inter-annotator 
agreement, thus producing a kappa score of 0.80 (indicative of very high agreement). These 
tweets contained multilingual content: English, German and Italian. Both annotators were 





Tweets and Retweets 
Twitter reported to the Senate committee that, of all the tweets studied from the 1st 
September 2016 to the 15th November 2016, 1 percent were US election related. Of these 1 
percent of election related tweets, 0.74 percent were Russian linked and had been detected by 
Twitter either as automation or spam. In the report Twitter only considers original tweets; all 
retweets are excluded2. 
  
Twitter identified 131,000 tweets from the accounts on the IRA list. Of these, 9 percent were 
about the American Election (11,790). The total number of tweets identified by Twitter as US 
Election Related was 189 million. Thus, 0.006 percent of US Election-related content was 
created by the IRA-related accounts. 
 
In our analysis, we confirm that these accounts were also creating Brexit-related content. In 
total we found 3,485 tweets from the IRA linked accounts, representing 0.005 percent of the 
total data we collected.  Our 0.005 percent figure includes retweets and drops to 0.002 percent 
when these are excluded. In our troll dataset 57.59 percent of data are retweets. 
  
The figures indicate that there is a lower level of activity in our set of IRA accounts 
discussing Brexit. This is perhaps not surprising: (i) accounts created to target the US election 
might be expected to be less active on the Brexit topic; (ii) Trolls may be more active on 
certain issues at certain points - the lower level of activity seen here could reflect the 
longitudinal nature of our dataset. We gathered and analysed data from a period of over two 
years whilst Twitter presented an analysis of data only from 1st September 2016 until 15th 
November 2016; and (iii) there are likely other trolls that are more active in the Brexit debate 
but these are not on the list submitted by Twitter. 
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Our longitudinal dataset allows us to move beyond a snapshot picture and to track the 
changes in activity and troll behaviour over time and in response to external events. In 
particular, we note a change in retweeting behaviour on the 23rd June 2016, the day of the 
UK-EU referendum vote. On this day we captured 1,059,888 tweets in total. Out of this total, 
389 of these tweets were from troll accounts (0.037 percent), over a seven-fold (7.4 percent) 
increase in the relative number of tweets that came from trolls on the day of the referendum. 
The vast majority of tweets captured on this day were retweets, something the headline value 
of 0.74 percent in the US Twitter report would fail to identify. In fact, only eleven tweets 
were original tweets. If we were to calculate troll activity excluding retweets, we find that on 
this day 0.001 percent of original data are from trolls, seriously underestimating their 
potential impact. Indeed, conducting the calculation in this way would indicate a misleading 
decrease in troll activity rather than an increase. This highlights the marked change in their 
behaviour on the day of the Brexit referendum vote. Although the trolls were more active, 
they produced more retweets and less original content. We must therefore consider this when 
we evaluate the 0.74 percent value given by Twitter. 
  
User Information 
We found tweets from 419 of the 2752 Twitter-identified accounts, with more than 
one tweet from 66.83 percent of accounts. The Brexit Tweets set we had tweets from 267 
accounts, with more than one tweet from 56.68 percent of accounts, indicating that most 
accounts engaged with the Brexit topic multiple times. 
  
We examined the information from the user metadata as extracted from the troll tweets. This 
metadata is generated automatically or added by the account holder. The information can 
change over time and/or be altered by the user. For example, the number of followers is an 
automated value that can vary, the user profile location field can be added by the account 
holder and can be changed over time. If the account contains fake information, such as with 
astro-turf-cyborgs, information that is added by the user can indicate the role and purpose of 
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the account. An account could be created to look like an American individual with a 
particular political opinion, expressed through the information added in fields such as location 
and user description. 
  
Date of account creation is an automatic field and cannot be changed. Most of the accounts 
were created in 2013 and 2014 (Figure 1) after the 2012 US Election but well before both the 
2016 US Election and the Brexit Referendum. More accounts are created in 2016, the year of 
the US Election (and the Brexit Referendum), than in either 2015 or 2017. Of the forty-four 
accounts created in 2016 thirty-eight were created after the Brexit referendum but before the 




To further determine whom the accounts were intended to represent, and therefore influence 
through ‘shared’ group identities, we analysed the user description field in the tweet 
metadata. We counted the occurrences of terms by the year of account creation, and we 
removed very common English and German words. Although a user can change the text in 
this field at anytime, we did not find any evidence of changes in the data we collected (we 
gathered data over 2 years and when we had multiple tweets from the same users this field 
always contained the same content). The full list of terms can be seen in Table 1. Many of the 
accounts do not have any terms at all in this field. The counts in Table 1 are small but do 
indicate a pattern. In 2013-2015 the accounts contained description terms that indicate 
American, conservative, patriotic personas, suggesting that the accounts were designed to 
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masquerade as US citizens and aimed to influence American events. But in 2016 many of the 
terms are German, mag (like), glaube (I believe), uern (likely a shortening of äuβern which 
translates as express). Therefore, the accounts created in 2016 may not, in fact, have been 
designed to tweet about the US election but something more European-focused.  
Table 1: Frequency of terms from the user level description field split by year 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
conservative 16 conservative 9 love 5 usa 5 trump 5 
blacklivesmatter 15 tcot 6 proud 4 ttip 3 2a 3 
love 11 wakeupamerica 5 tcot 4 fr 3 follow 2 
tcot 11 patriot 4 family 4 mag 3 mom 2 
dont 8 supporter 4 country 4 glaube 2 god 2 
pjnet 7 life 4 christian 3 uern 2 starke 1 
wakeupamerica 7 pjnet 3 conservative 3 studiere 2 coordinator 1 
life 7 dont 3 patriot 2 freizeit 2 broker 1 
2a 6 2a 3 youre 2 spiele 2 moment 1 
  
Of the forty-four accounts created in 2016 we found twelve of the accounts created in July 
2016 had German language descriptions (of the rest one was in English, one was mixed 
German and English, two only contained hashtags, and the rest were empty). For comparison, 
in 2015, sixteen were in English, three in German and four were empty. 
 
The German language use in accounts created after the 2016 Brexit vote suggests that the 
trolls were using the result of the vote to push a wider disruptive agenda beyond the impact in 
the UK; perhaps anticipating the German elections in 2017 with Angela Merkel’s 
announcement in November 2016 that she would run for a fourth term as German 
Chancellor.  December 2016 saw Italian elections and the re-vote in the controversial 
Austrian Presidential election. 
 
We also analysed the user location fields. We found 154 accounts to claim to be based in the 
USA, sixteen in Europe and three in Russia (94 had no location information). The sixteen 
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European accounts were made up of seven German accounts, five Italian accounts, three from 
the UK and one from Belgium. Term counts from the location field are shown in Table 2. The 
European-based accounts were mainly created in 2016 and later. This location information 
suggests that most of the accounts on the list submitted by Twitter to US Senate were indeed 
designed to look like they are from the USA. The agenda they were designed to follow was 
also related to the USA, but those created in and after 2016 had a different agenda. 
Table 2: Frequency of individual terms from the user location field split by year 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
usa 51 usa 21 usa 6 deutschland 3 estados 4 
states 12 atlanta 10 texas 3 berlin 2 unidos 4 
united 12 us 5 germany 2 hessen 1 italia 2 
chicago 4 states 3 brussel 1     main 1 
us 4 united 3 stlouis 1     lombardia 1 
il 4 la 2 tennessee 1     frankfurt 1 
ny 3 new 2 states 1     italy 1 
baltimore 2 york 2 richmond 1     sicilia 1 
ga 2 pittsburgh 1 united 1     itala 1 
Atlanta 2 ga 1 wisconsin 1     milano 1 
  
Some of the accounts have many followers and therefore a high potential to reach other 
Twitter users, thus magnifying the normalising wallpaper effect of their content. Using the 
maximum number of followers when we had multiple tweets from an account, we found that, 
of the 267 that had tweeted about Brexit: 122 accounts had more than 1,000 followers; sixteen 
accounts had over 10,000; and one account had over 100,000. The median number of 
followers is 875. As we cannot tell from this dataset how many of the trolls follow each other, 
this high median number should be treated with caution. There is a very slight positive 
correlation (Pearsons’ Rho 0.01) between number of followers and number of captured 
tweets, this should also be treated with caution as we do not capture all of the tweets from 




The hashtags that are used by the troll accounts indicate the different topics discussed in both 
the Brexit Tweet and the Related Tweet sets. Table 3 shows the top hashtags in each set. In 
the Brexit Tweet set the hashtags used are related to Brexit, Britain, and the EU. In the top ten 
we also find hashtags relating to Chancellor Merkel, #merkel, and #merkelmussbleiben 
(which translates as #merkelmuststay). The accounts are directly discussing Brexit but also 
using wider hashtags for example referring to the role of the German Chancellor Merkel, 
underlining the wider European context of the Brexit debate. 
  
In the Related Tweet set we can see that the trolls use hashtags about the EU, #eu; about 
refugees, #refugeeswelcome, #flchtlinge (which translates as #refugee) and #refugee. We see 
mentions of the German Chancellor, #merkel and the President of Turkey #erdogan, we also 
see reference to Germany, #deutschland and Turkey #trkei. We also see that tweets that were 
classified as not directly about Brexit are still being tagged with the #brexit hashtag. 
  
The way that the hashtags are being used in the wider Brexit related set suggests that the trolls 
have an agenda that related to Germany and Turkey and were using the Brexit topic to push 
this agenda and create a sympathetic audience on the controversial wider issue of migration. 
Elections were held in Germany on 24th September 2017, and in Turkey there was a 
constitutional referendum held on the 16th April 2017. 
Table 3: Hashtags frequency across the data specifically on Brexit (Brexit) and those on Brexit 
related tweets (Related) 
Brexit   Related   
#brexit 825 #eu 1206 
#britaininout 378 #merkel 286 
#euref 364 #refugeeswelcome 281 
#brexitornot 211 #flchtlinge 199 
#goodbyeuk 188 #erdogan 158 
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#brexitinout 186 #europe 153 
#remainineu 168 #deutschland 146 
#eu 158 #trkei 128 
#merkelmussbleiben 125 #brexit 113 
#merkel 111 #refugee 80 
  
Sentiment and Stance 
We annotated the 1,357 Brexit Tweets for both stance and sentiment. The annotator was 
asked to rate the stance of the tweets as either pro-leaving or pro-remaining in the EU or 
neutral/neither. For sentiment the tweets were annotated as containing positive, negative or 
neutral sentiment. The majority of tweets were both neutral in stance (78.78 percent) and 
sentiment (64.41 percent), although this may be a consequence of the lack of available image 
or video context. Overall the tweets had a stronger pro-leave stance (14.96 percent) than pro-
remain (6.26 percent). The split of sentiment was fairly equal with a positive sentiment (18.35 
percent) being very slightly higher than negative sentiment (17.24 percent). 
  
The pro-leave stance was consistently higher throughout the time period (Figure 2a). The 
sentiment scores do change over time (Figure 2b). In particular there was a spike of positive 
sentiment tweets on the 21st July 2016. This was a spike in volume that occurred on the day 
that UK Prime Minister May met German Chancellor Merkel (see next section). A high 
percentage of these (73.44percent) were original content not retweets and the tweets were in 
German. The content driving this change in sentiment direction revolves around Chancellor 
Merkel, describing her as a strong person that will handle the Brexit issue well. The trolls 
discuss new possibilities and options after Brexit and that Frankfurt will be soon in a stronger 
position. A few trolls also talk about the EU accession of Turkey and that Merkel does not 
want any negotiations if Turkey re-introduces the death penalty. 
  
Figure 2 a) Stance of Tweets and b) Sentiment of Tweets 
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Overall there were very few tweets per day from the troll accounts. The number of tweets per 
day follows a similar pattern in both the Brexit Tweet and the Related Tweet sets. In both 
cases, we find these patterns to be closely related to external events. We can see in Figure 3 
that there are several spikes of activity for the Brexit Tweets dataset.  
Figure 3. Number of Tweets over time a) by day across the full dataset b) by hour on the 
23rd June 2016 
a) b)  
  
In Table 4 we show the dates, volumes, whether the tweet was original content or a retweet 
and what was happening in the news that may have triggered the content. We found that the 
spikes in content production are related to particular events such as the referendum vote itself 
or the UK Prime Minister May meeting German Chancellor Merkel. There is a difference in 
troll behaviour on two particular dates that exhibit higher tweet volumes. On the 23rd June 
2016, the day of the UK’s EU referendum, there is a large increase in volume of tweets 
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produced that consists almost entirely retweets (97.73 percent). In contrast, on the 21st July 
2016 there was a considerably larger proportion of original content produced: only 26.56 
percent on this day are retweets. There is also a conspicuous spike on the 19th February 2016. 
On a closer inspection of the data from this day, we found that all the tweets come from a 
single troll account. 
Table 4: Further information about the days that had the highest frequency of tweets 
Date Tweets percent RT What happened on that day? 
19/02/2016 44  100.00  Cameron at EU summit 
23/06/2016 398  97.74  UK-EU referendum 
24/06/2016 51 49.02 Day after UK-EU referendum 
28/06/2016 47 70.21 Cameron to meet EU leaders 
21/07/2016 128 26.56 May meets Merkel 
29/03/2017 40 45.00 UK triggers Article 50 process 
29/04/2017 32 100.00 EU Council Guidelines for Brexit Negotiations issued 
  
 
The Day of the Brexit Referendum 
The largest number of troll tweets was collected on the day of the referendum, the 23rd of 
June 2016. The difference in content on this date is shown in Table 5. We collected 400 in 
total of which 398 were directly about Brexit. It is difficult to compare troll behaviour with 
the behaviour of an average Twitter user as the median number of tweets from a user in our 
set is 1 (there are many tweets from a few users but the majority only tweets once), but this 
overall surge in number of tweets contrasts starkly with non-troll account behaviour which 
saw a surge on the day after Brexit when the referendum result was known. On referendum 
day, of the 398 Brexit troll tweets, only nine (and eleven tweets out of the 400 total) consisted 
of original content, the rest were retweets. 97.73 percent of tweets on the day of the 
referendum were retweets. The trolls were therefore focused entirely on Brexit and shifted to 
retweeting rather than producing original content. 
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Out of the 387 retweets 279 were retweets of other trolls from the list issued to Senate by 
Twitter (72.10 percent). These tweets originate from only 11 troll accounts, and 186 were 
retweets originating from a single troll account. These 186 tweets exhibit a very similar 
homogeneity in style, content and format (text in italics altered from original): 
 
@USER #brexitornot #britaininout #brexitinout #euref https://t.co/VARIOUS 
  
Table 5: The most frequent hashtags from the brexit dataset on the 23rd June 2016, the day of 
the referendum and on all other days 
All other days 23rd June 2016 
#brexit 787 #britaininout 378 
#eu 148 #euref 354 
#merkelmussbleiben 125 #brexitornot 211 
#merkel 110 #goodbyeuk 187 
#euco 89 #brexitinout 186 
#ukineu 64 #remainineu 168 
#may 60 #brexit 38 
#uk 33 #reasonstoleaveeu 14 
#article50 31 #eu 10 
#girlstalkselfies 18 #uk 8 
  
  
In Figure 3b we see the frequency of tweets grouped by hour across the day of the 
referendum. The vast majority of tweets were sent between 2pm and 4pm in a highly 
concentrated effort. There were no tweets after 4pm although the polls did not close until 
10pm. The nine tweets consisting of original content were tweeted early in the day, and two 




A social-media amplifier is defined as a user that shares ideas and opinions (Tinati et al. 
2012). Amplification is a key element of astro-turfing for grass-root twitter mobilisation. In 
this context we will use the term amplifier to classify an account that, as far as we can see 
from the data we have collected, only ever retweets. 
  
We have a large number of trolls who are amplifiers in our set. To judge if their behaviour 
changed on the referendum polling day we analysed troll accounts which sent tweets on both 
the 23rd June and other days. In the Brexit Tweets set we have tweets from 248 troll 
accounts, of which 38 of them were active on the 23rd June 2016. Of those accounts, 19 (50 
percent) also appear on other days. The other 19 troll accounts may only have tweeted about 
Brexit on the 23rd June or it could just mean we did not catch them in our dataset. 
  
Only nine tweets were not retweets on the 23rd June. Those original content tweets all came 
from accounts that tweeted on other days as well. In this dataset the accounts that only 
tweeted on the 23rd June 2016 were amplifiers. Thirteen of the accounts acted as amplifiers 
on the 23rd June and twelve in the wider time period. As we do not have all of the tweets 
produced by all trolls we cannot establish a definitive pattern but this suggests that, while 
some accounts may simply be amplifiers, content producers can also switch their behaviour to 
amplification if required. These trolls may be more likely to be one or another but these 
behaviour patterns can change. On the day of the referendum vote we found that all of the 
IRA troll accounts were more likely to be involved in amplification behaviour. 
  
Discussion 
The IRA accounts identified by Twitter as specifically tweeting about the US 2016 elections, 
were also active in the Brexit debate. A limitation of this study is that it is likely we do not 
have all of the content produced on this topic and, as the content is no longer available from 
Twitter, there may be more content that we have not analysed here. We also can not speculate 
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what these accounts were doing when they are not tweeting about either the US election or 
Brexit as this data is not available. 
 
We have observed that these trolls do tweet about the Brexit but the volume is small. Given 
that this is a ‘low cost behaviour’ we might have expected to see more activity if aim of these 
accounts was to influence the referendum. We only find 3,485 tweets in a dataset of over 70 
million. On the other hand, it is perhaps surprising that we find content on Brexit from these 
accounts at all, as they were accounts submitted by Twitter to the US Senate committee that 
were thought to be attempting to influence the US Elections. Why then do they tweet about 
Brexit at all if this is not their main agenda? Consistent with known Russian disinformation 
strategies and ‘active-measures’ we suggest that Brexit as a controversial issue with wider 
implications in relation to, for example, international free-trade deals and for EU-wide 
stability, provided a suitable topic for generalised disruptive tweeting. This also suggests that 
there are likely other accounts specifically designed by the IRA to look like Brexit grassroots 
activists that have not yet been released by Twitter. 
  
The tweets that we collected from troll accounts were slightly more likely to be pro-leave 
than pro-remain. These accounts were not, however, designed to look like either pro-leave or 
pro-remain grassroots individuals; this is unsurprising as it appears that influencing the Brexit 
referendum was not a priority for these troll accounts.  Given the source of the list and the 
characteristics we have uncovered, these were designed to be active in the US and perhaps 
latterly in the German elections. This is supported by the dates of creation of the accounts and 
the personas used; 2013 and 2014 accounts were designed to look like American activists and 
2016 were designed to look German.  
  
The Brexit tweets analysed here may, of course, simply constitute background noise, 
designed to make the American and latterly German sock-puppet accounts look either more 
human or more politically aware. It is clear, as some accounts were created as far back as 
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2013, that the IRA is was playing a long game rather than seeking always to directly 
influence voting behaviour. Spikes in data production, were closely related to external events. 
We see, for example, on the 21st July there was a high level of positive original content 
produced that was related to Merkel and Brexit, certainly pointing towards the use of Brexit 
in wider political context, not only in relation to internal UK Brexit dynamics.  
  
The strategy employed by these accounts clearly shifted on the day of the referendum where 
we observe an apparent shift to amplification behaviour on the Brexit issue. The change in 
behaviour on this specific date, the day of the referendum vote, indicates a possible attempt to 
directly influence public behaviour. The longitudinal nature of our data collection technique 
allowed us to investigate these behavioural changes and adaptations. Many retweets that 
contain very similar content were tweeted over a short time frame. The IRA-identified trolls 
began almost exclusively to retweet other trolls on Brexit issues on referendum day, with 
virtual abandonment of the generation of original content. This change in behaviour indicates 
a clear change in strategy from the IRA, this may of course be coincidental but, the date of 
change makes this seem unlikely, especially as the account behaviour returns to normal after 
this event. 
 
This observed change in behaviour indicates a possible method for cyborg identification. The 
accounts we tracked combined apparently automated ‘bot’ behaviour and human troll activity, 
suggesting that these are in fact cyborg accounts. Automated behaviour can be automatically 
detected as opposed to human ‘troll’ behaviour, which is more difficult to detect.  If we had 
studied the data from the 23rd June 2016 in isolation then the cyborg troll accounts would 
simply have resembled bot accounts, and might easily have been mis-classified. To 
successfully identify the cyborg accounts it was necessary to systematically look for changes 
in behaviour over time. If we can identify accounts that combine behaviours this would 
enable us to develop better methods to identify these harder to spot cyborg accounts. 
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It is likely that the referendum day tweets were produced automatically or exhibit the cut and 
paste behaviour seen in the South Korean Election (Keller, 2017). It appears that the operators 
of the American and German personae had been instructed to tweet on the Brexit topic en-
masse, suggesting that sock-puppet accounts were being re-purposed to target international 
electoral developments - shifting their behaviour and the target of activity as required or as 
instructed when significant or potentially disruptive events emerge. In which case, 
overlapping patterns of troll activity are likely to be observed and any forthcoming lists of 




All 2,752 of the accounts identified by Twitter as having IRA-links have since been 
suspended and the information posted by them is therefore no longer available through 
Twitter, making our archive a unique source of insight into so-called troll behaviour on the 
Brexit issue. Despite the absence of an equivalent list of ‘trolls’ that sought to target the 
Brexit referendum specifically, there is clear evidence that the IRA-directed activity altered 
dramatically on the day of the referendum to target this event. Our longitudinal approach 
suggests that these accounts exhibited behaviour consistent with hybrid human/automated 
activity, raising questions about potential mis-classification of bot/troll activity in short-term 
studies. Much of the observed activity in our dataset post-dated the referendum and their 
activity was not directed solely at the internal UK Brexit process. Rather it appears that this 
was a part of a more widespread, centrally coordinated IRA effort to influence international 
electoral processes, with troll activity temporarily diverted and repurposed to the Brexit case. 
This is consistent with known Kremlin disinformation approaches, and ‘active-measures’, 
utilising controversial topics to escalates underlying uncertainty and to create a sense of 
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